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Abstract: 
China and India are touted as new entrepreneurship powerhouses. The two countries’ different 
institutional history and characteristics have led to differences in environments related to 
entrepreneurship. There are some well-founded rationales as well as a number of misinformed 
and ill-guided viewpoints about the friendliness of the environment to support entrepreneurship 
in each country as well as the China–India differences concerning entrepreneurial environment. 
This article contributes to this debate by offering theoretical and empirical evidence regarding 
the differences in regulative institutions in the two economies. Specifically, we compare the 
state’s regulative, participative, and supportive roles from the standpoint of entrepreneurship in 
the two countries. 
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Introduction 
China and India are touted as new entrepreneurship powerhouses. In a Zogby International’s 
survey conducted among Americans, 49% of the respondents said that China or Japan provide 
the “creative and entrepreneurial milieu required to form the world’s next technological 
innovator” (America 2007). Likewise, because of its entrepreneurial performance in recent years, 
analysts consider India as “the next Asian miracle” (Huang 2008, p.32). 
The literature is often plagued with claims and counter claims regarding the friendliness of the 
environment to support entrepreneurship in China and India as well as the superiority of one 
country over another. First, consider China. One view is that China is “shifting from top-down, 
state-directed technology policies to more flexible, market-oriented approaches that foster 
innovation and entrepreneurship” (Segal 2004). Schramm (2004) considers China as the most 
spectacular example of a developing country that pays proper attention to what he refers as the 
four sectors of the entrepreneurial system—high-impact entrepreneurs, large mature firms, the 
government, and universities. The opposite argument is that the Chinese government has 
exercised its power over its firms in a “chaotic way,” which has hindered entrepreneurship in the 
country (Gilboy 2004). Petras (2008) argues that most Chinese billionaires “secured political 
influence through kinship ties” and grabbed or created assets by making a “deal” with “regional, 
provincial or municipal party officials” (p. 323). 
A similar point can be made about India. It is argued that India is “shifting away from a legacy of 
state-dominated commerce toward a market-oriented system” (Stewart et al. 2008, p. 85). The 
country has set an “explicit policy objective to become a leading business-friendly economy” 
(World Bank 2008a). For instance, India is introducing electronic registration for businesses 
(Economist 2009a). Huang (2008) notes that India is “shedding [its] harmful legacy” and Indian 
politics has become “more open and accountable.” Bureaucratic barriers in the country, however, 
lead to longer time, higher cost, and reduced speed and flexibility for entrepreneurs to create and 
expand their ventures (Majumdar 2004). At the same time, influential entrepreneurs take 
advantage of various institutional holes in the country. Petras (2008) notes that most Indian 
billionaires built their wealth by “using economic power to secure neo-liberal policies” (p. 323). 
He goes on saying, “While many Indian publicists and economists hail the “Indian miracle” and 
classify India as an “emerging world power” because of the high growth rates of the past 5 years, 
what really has transpired is the conversion of India into a billionaire’s paradise” (Petras 2008, p. 
323). 
There is also a disagreement among analysts as to which of the two countries has a more 
favorable and conducive environment for entrepreneurship. A more mainstream view would be 
that democratic societies such as India are more likely to benefit from globalization (Bremmer 
2007). Consistent with this view, Huang (2008) notes that, in a number of important areas, 
institutional reform has gained a higher momentum in India than in China. India, for instance, 
outperforms China on almost all of the World Bank’s (2008a, b) governance indicators (Table 1). 
Chi Lo, the author of Phantom of the China Economic Threat, however, commented, “The 
biggest obstacle to India outperforming China is reform inertia”1 (The International Economy 
2006). India’s most important barrier to entrepreneurship arguably centers on red tape and 
bureaucracies on the national and state levels (The International Economy 2006). 
Table 1 has been omitted from this formatted document. 
Mysterious and complex natures of entrepreneurship landscapes in the two countries are 
highlighted in the above observations. In prior theoretical and empirical research, scholars have 
noted that contexts and environment play important roles in determining entrepreneurial 
behavior (FORA 2006; Tan 2002). The operating environment for entrepreneurs is arguably 
more complex in emerging economies such as India and China than in developing economies. 
The complexity necessitates more careful scanning for entrepreneurs in developing countries 
(Stewart et al. 2008). 
To put things in context, formal and informal institutions have considerable influence on 
entrepreneurship (Ahmad and Hoffmann 2008; North 1990). Prior researchers have noted that 
institutional environments in developed and emerging economies differ substantially (Stewart et 
al. 2008). While some studies on entrepreneurship in emerging economies have shed some light 
on the impacts of informal institutions such as national culture on entrepreneurship (e.g., 
Busenitz and Lau 1997; Mueller and Thomas 2001; Busenitz et al. 2000), the issue of how 
formal institutions affect entrepreneurship in these economies is a little-examined problem in 
entrepreneurship research. This issue is rather important as regulatory framework is one of the 
important determinants of entrepreneurial performance (Ahmad and Hoffmann 2008). 
There is also a relative scarcity of research involving cross-country comparison of the impacts of 
institutions on entrepreneurship in emerging economies. Likewise, current understanding of 
theorization regarding the difference in the entrepreneurial landscape in China and India is 
sketchy because little empirical work exists. The purpose of our study is to fill this void. 
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates the differences between regulative 
institutions affecting entrepreneurship in China and India. This issue is rather important due to 
the fact that the state is arguably the most important institutional actor and powerful driver of 
institutional isomorphism since violations of laws and regulations can result in harsh sanctions 
(Bresser and Millonig 2003; Groenewegen and van der Steen 2007). It is widely documented that 
relevant laws, regulations, and their enforcement characteristics facilitate as well as hamper 
birth, growth, survival, and mortality of firms (Kiggundu 2002; Porter 1980; Stevenson 1998). 
Regulative institutions’ role in promoting entrepreneurship is widely recognized in both the 
academic literature and policy documents concerned with this topic. For instance, “the need to 
reduce regulatory and administrative burdens affecting entrepreneurial activity; the increasing 
attention given by governments to entrepreneurship education and training; the need to ease 
SME access to financing, technology, innovation and international markets; …. and local policy 
issues” are emphasized among critical factors that influence SMEs’ success (OECD 2005). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section provides a literature review 
on institutions and entrepreneurship in emerging economies. Then, we compare regulative 
institutions affecting entrepreneurship in China and India. Next, we discuss the data, analysis, 
and findings. Finally, we provide discussion and implications. 
Literature review: Institutions and entrepreneurship in emerging economies 
 
All economic phenomena arguably have institutional components and implications (Parto 2005). 
In a larger sense, institutions are “macro-level rules of the game,” which include formal 
constraints such as rules, laws, constitutions and informal constraints such as social norms, 
conventions and self-imposed codes (North 1996). Scott (1995, 2001) has proposed three 
institutional pillars—regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. They are related to “legally 
sanctioned behavior,” “morally governed behavior,” and “recognizable, taken-for-granted 
behavior,” respectively (Scott et al. 2000, p. 238). The regulative pillar can be mapped with 
formal institutions while normative and cultural-cognitive pillars are related to informal 
institutions. 
Although international entrepreneurship researchers have acknowledged the role of supportive 
and conducive environment in the growth of entrepreneurial firms, especially of SMEs (Etemad 
2003, 2004), they have devoted relatively less attention to sources that contribute to such 
environment in emerging economies. Specifically, the pace and proliferation of research 
focusing on institutional influence on entrepreneurship have been slow (Ahistrom and Bruton 
2002; Peng 2000a). Concerns regarding a lack of application of institutional theory on 
entrepreneurship research have been ringing in the literature (Ahistrom and Bruton 2002; Peng 
2000a). 
Most of the existing institutional studies on entrepreneurship in emerging economies have 
narrowly focused on informal institutions, especially on national culture (Busenitz et al. 2000; 
Busenitz and Lau 1997; Mueller and Thomas 2001). A number of them have linked Hofstede’s 
(1980, 1994) cultural dimensions—especially individualism—to examine a country’s propensity 
to engage in entrepreneurial activities (Ahistrom and Bruton 2002). 
Entrepreneurship researchers studying the Chinese economy have focused primarily on social 
and cultural dynamics affecting entrepreneurship. Some researchers have suggested that Chinese 
culture tends to lack the characteristics needed to be successful entrepreneurs such as 
independent thinking, risk taking, innovativeness, and self-determination (Holt 1997; Anderson 
et al. 2003). Prior researchers have also noted the important role of perceptions related to an 
entrepreneur’s social obligations in China and how such perceptions have affected 
entrepreneurship (Lau et al. 2001; Hsu 2006; Mourdoukoutas 2004; Hoogewerf 2002). 
In India’s case, the national culture–entrepreneurship relationship has been investigated mainly 
from the standpoint of the country’s major religions such as Hinduism and Islam. As researchers 
such as Dana (2000) and Elliot (1998) make clear, many beliefs and values associated with major 
religions in India run counter to capitalism and entrepreneurship. The studies of many 
researchers over the past few decades have indicated that obligations associated with the Indian 
caste system make it more compelling and convenient to follow the family occupation instead of 
launching a new venture (Medhora 1965; Weber 1958). Observers also suggest that people in the 
country work primarily because of emotional attachment with the workplace or as a favor to the 
supervisor or to the employer (McClelland 1975; Kahar 1978). 
Researchers have, however, pointed to declining differences across cultures (Baumol 1986). 
Many studies have provided support for the notion that culture alone is insufficient to describe 
cross-country differences in entrepreneurial activities (Kshetri 2007). This is thus an important 
gap in the literature since economic, political, and legal institutions play critical roles in shaping 
entrepreneurship (Djankov et al. 2006). Referring to China, Guiheux (2006) argues that 
entrepreneurship in the country can be attributed to initiatives coming from society (informal 
institutions) as well as the setting up of a new legal framework (formal institutions). 
Another drawback of existing research in this area is that there has been a lack of cross-country 
studies that analyze the institutional influence on entrepreneurship. Especially empirical research 
on cross-national entrepreneurship has been limited, primarily, we believe, because of 
shortcomings with data. 
An examination of regulative institutions related to entrepreneurship is thus interesting both 
theoretically and from the point of view of practical applications. This is because regulative 
institutions can be changed more easily and quickly than other components of institutions. 
North (1990, p. 6) noted that “although formal rules may change overnight as the result of 
political and judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes 
of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies.” For instance, one study indicated 
that, in developing countries, a 10-day reduction in the time taken to start a business can lead to a 
0.4 percentage point increase in GDP growth (Economist 2009b). This means that motivated 
policy makers in emerging economies could overcome some of the challenges and can introduce 
appropriate regulative changes to facilitate entrepreneurial development. Prior researchers have 
noted the important role of political support and government policies in the rate of new firm 
creation (Reynolds et al. 1994). A lack of property rights and excessive government regulation 
hinder entrepreneurship in many developing countries (Zedillo 2004). Proactive government 
policies in the areas of R&D investments, patents, and labor mobility, on the other hand, 
positively affect new firm formation (Choi and Phan 2006). 
The increasing importance of this topic is also recognized by the fact that the development of 
private entrepreneurial firms is a relatively new but increasingly salient phenomenon in emerging 
economies (Ahistrom and Bruton 2002; Kshetri 2009b, 2010). We focused on China and India 
because these are the world’s two biggest emerging economies. In recent years, they have also 
been an engine of the global economic growth. A preliminary analysis indicated that excluding 
the economies that experienced negative growths, China and India accounted for 66% and 11%, 
respectively, of global growths in GDP in 2009 (Ghemawat 2010). Note too that there are strong 
similarities and significant differences between the environments of China and India from the 
standpoint of entrepreneurship. A comparison of regulative institutions in the two countries 
might provide insights into different aspects of the government’s roles in facilitating or hindering 
entrepreneurship. Finally, these two economies have been held up as development role models 
for other developing countries, especially those in Africa. Observers note that China has 
gradually changed its role in Africa from a mere trade partner to more “advisory approach” 
(China: Country Analysis Report 2009). Likewise, in 2008, India played host to development 
experts from Africa (Economist 2008). From the follower countries’ perspective, it is essential to 
understand their role models’ strengths and weakness so that they exactly know what to imitate 
and how to evaluate the success of an imitation. 
The state’s roles, regulative institutions, and entrepreneurship 
 
In an attempt to achieve various goals, powerful organizations such as state agencies attempt to 
create and alter institutional rules (Leblebici et al. 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Such rules 
established by the modern state in areas such as property rights, competition and anti-trust 
policy, governance structures, and market exchange govern behaviors of entrepreneurial firms 
and other economic actors (Dobbin and Dowd 1997; Fligstein 1996; Roy 1997). In particular, 
Porter (1980) has argued that tighter government regulations may impose significant barriers to 
entry for new firms. Prior research also indicates that government policies are likely to have 
more salient effects in shaping the competitive environment of firms than in promoting specific 
business practices (Dobbin and Dowd 1997). 
The state’s roles in promoting or inhibiting the growth of entrepreneurship are typically framed 
as regulative institutions in the institutional literature. Note that regulative institutions consist of 
“explicit regulative processes: rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities” (Scott 1995, p. 
35). In the current context, such institutions consist of regulatory bodies (e.g., the governments in 
the two countries, major political parties such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), etc.) and 
existing laws and rules that influence the development of entrepreneurship. Specifically, we 
examine three distinct but related components of regulative institutions—regulatory, 
participatory, and supportive. These three components adequately cover the processes and most 
of the roles and functions of the state associated with the development of entrepreneurship. Let’s 
take a look at each of the components in turn. 
Regulatory roles 
 
By regulatory state, Sobel (1999) means a set of factors that influence the enforcement of 
contracts, the rule of law, the risk of expropriation, corruption of government, and bureaucratic 
quality. A country with a strong rule of law has “sound political institutions, a strong court 
system” and citizens are “willing to accept the established institutions and to make and 
implement laws and adjudicate disputes” (International Country Risk Guide 1996). Put 
differently, a strong rule of law is characterized by effective punishment to transgressors (Oxley 
and Yeung 2001). In overly politicized and less free states, which lack rule of law, 
entrepreneurial efforts are diverted away from wealth creation into non-market behavior 
entailing securing protection from market forces (Campbell and Rogers 2007; Clark and Lee 
2006; Kreft and Sobel 2005; Sobel et al. 2007). In particular, recognition of contract law is 
important in producing trust in business transactions (Humphrey and Schmitz 1998; Nichols 
1999; Stiglitz and Squire 1998). 
It is worth noting that, in many emerging economies, the rule of law is “often weakly developed” 
or sometimes “ignored with impunity” (Bratton 2007). Factors such as corruption and the 
effectiveness of legal system in enforcing contracts act as barrier to entrepreneurship (Sievers 
2001). In the absence of effective legal enforcement of private property rights, entrepreneurs find 
it more attractive to acquire political and administrative protection or depend upon informal 
norms for security (Yang 2002). A lack of mechanisms related to the protection of intellectual 
property and discouraging monopolies and unfair trade practices also hinder entrepreneurship 
(Schramm 2004). Kreft and Sobel (2005: 604) forcefully state: 
Creative individuals are more likely to engage in the creation of new wealth through productive 
market entrepreneurship. In areas without these institutions, creative individuals are more likely 




The term “participatory state” captures the extent to which policies and institutions represent the 
wishes of the members of society (Sobel 1999). In such a state, businesses may participate in the 
national policy making arena through “dialogue, litigation, and mimesis” (Edelman and 
Suchman 1997). Prior research indicates that business groups can work closely with state 
agencies to protect their independence and autonomy (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). 
In some situations, particularly when business groups are strong, the nation may find it important 
to collaborate with them in rationalizing different activities (Scott 1992, p. 211). Business groups 
are also involved in a “highly interactive process of social construction,” which influences the 
practical meaning of a law-in-action (Edelman and Suchman 1997). 
Supportive roles 
 
Of equal importance in the discussion of regulative institutions that follows below is the state’s 
supportive role. In this regard, it is important to note that in many emerging economies new 
businesses face a host of barriers such as burdens related to tax systems and bureaucracy, 
absence of relevant commercial laws, dysfunctional financial markets, and a lack of know-how. 
Different theoretical contributions and various empirical studies have led to the accepted view 
that the government can attack barriers to entrepreneurship related to skills, information, market, 
and infrastructures by legal and non-legal influences. Scholars examining the development of 
information and communications technology (ICT) industry have identified these influences in 
the form of new laws, investment incentives, foreign technology transfer, and other supply-push 
and demand-pull forces (King et al. 1994; Montealegre 1999). For instance, Singapore has 
developed itself as an ICT hub of Asia by providing attractive infrastructure, skilled workers, and 
a stable labor environment which attracted a large number of ICT firms to locate there (Kraemer 
et al. 1992; Wong 1998). Similarly, strong university–industry linkages and a large pool of 
highly trained scientists and engineers have driven the development of ICT industries in Israel 
(Porter and Stern 2001). 
Regulative institutions in emerging economies’ contexts 
 
Prior to discussing regulative institutions in emerging economies, it is worthwhile to discuss how 
behaviors of firms as well as government regulations are affected by institutional contexts. Prior 
research indicates that strategies as well as performance of firms are functions of the institutional 
contexts (Hirsch 1975; Meyer et al. 2009). Commenting on how the state’s roles vary according 
to the context, Fligstein (1996, p. 660) notes: “[S]tates are important to the formation and 
ongoing stability of markets. How they will be important and to what degree is a matter of 
context.” 
The literature suggests the possibly differential roles and mechanisms by which the state 
regulates entrepreneurial activities in emerging and developed economies. For one thing, 
institutions in emerging economies are more likely to be associated with “institutional voids” 
than those in industrialized economies (Khanna and Palepu 1997). This means that institutional 
boundaries for economic activities are not well defined in most emerging economies. In many 
developing countries, starting a business entails overcoming a significant amount of red tape 
(Schramm 2004). 
Another distinctive feature of institutional contexts in most emerging economies concerns a 
weak rule of law. For instance, some argue that, in China “the law is marginalized and the legal 
system relegated to a lowly position in a spectrum of meditative mechanisms, while at the same 
time available for manipulation by powerful sectors within the state and the society at large” 
(Myers 1996). Exploitation of the regulative uncertainty and the weak rules of laws has arguably 
become an important form of entrepreneurship in China (Kolko 1997). Yang (2002) refers to this 
phenomenon as “double entrepreneurship,” which entails maximizing economic rewards and 
minimizing sociopolitical risks. In China, entrepreneurs find attractive economic niches from 
outside the current institutional boundaries (Yang 2002). For instance, entrepreneurs depend on 
relations with government bureaucrats to obtain a business license (Mourdoukoutas 2004). 
The above discussion indicates that entrepreneurial firms operating in emerging economies need 
to respond to environmental and institutional contexts that are significantly different from those 
in industrialized countries. As noted earlier, the development of private entrepreneurial firms is a 
relatively new phenomenon in emerging economies (Ahistrom and Bruton 2002; Kshetri 2009b, 
2010). There was a low level of social and political acceptance of such firms in many emerging 
economies in the past (Peng 2000b; Tsang 1996). That is, they lacked sociopolitical legitimation 
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994). The situation is, however, changing in many emerging economies 
(America 2007; Huang 2008). Nonetheless, they are “vulnerable to the liabilities of newness” 
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994, p. 663). Owners and managers of private firms are under tremendous 
pressure to find creative ways to respond to their environments in these economies (Ahlstrom 
and Bruton 2001, 2002; Peng 2000a; Tsang 1996). 
Many entrepreneurs in these economies are engaged in the creation of new ventures in economic 
sectors that are in a nascent and formative stage and thus have few or no precedents (e.g., Kshetri 
and Dholakia 2009). Note too that institutional formation and change are resource-intensive tasks 
(Leblebici et al. 1991). The governments in many emerging economies lack resources to create 
institutions (Kshetri and Dholakia 2009). Policy makers as well as entrepreneurs in such 
industries thus face challenges that are different and more complex than those in industrialized 
countries (Aldrich and Fiol 1994, p. 645). 
The differences between the institutions related to entrepreneurship in emerging and developed 
economies can also be explained in terms of three major sources of pressure on institutionalized 
norms or practices proposed by Oliver (1992): functional, political, and social. As we show 
below, emerging economies’ contexts are different from those in industrialized economies from 
the standpoint of these pressures. 
Functional pressures arise from perceived problems in performance levels or the perceived utility 
associated with institutionalized practices (Dacin et al. 2002, p. 45). For instance, governments in 
Central and Eastern European economies (CEE), China and Vietnam have realized that central 
plan is linked to poor economic performance (Kshetri 2009b). The upshot of this issue is that 
governments in these economies are encouraging free-market entrepreneurship in response to the 
resulting functional pressures. 
From this paper’s perspective, the most relevant issues concern political pressures which are 
created by shifts in the interests and power distributions of various institutional actors. 
Entrepreneurs’ acceptance into the CCP’s inner circle in China is illustrative of the creation of 
such pressures in favor of private entrepreneurship. The CCP in 2002 changed its bylaws to 
allow entrepreneurs to become members (Loyalka and Dammon 2006). In a 2001 speech during 
celebrations of the party’s 80th anniversary, then President Jiang Zemin acknowledged the 
benefit capitalists bring to the economy (Hoogewerf 2002). He also handed party membership to 
a capitalist and founder of one of China’s most respected private companies and the first private 
company to list on a foreign stock exchange (Pomfret 2001). In another instance, in 2003, the 
CCP appointed one of China’s wealthiest private entrepreneurs as deputy chairman of an 
advisory body to the government of Chongqing municipality. He was the first private 
businessman in China to be awarded such a high position (Economist 2003). 
Prior researchers have recognized that the shifts associated with political pressures may occur 
due to factors such as performance crises and changes in the environment. Organizations may be 
forced to question the legitimacy of a given practice in response to such changes (Dacin et al. 
2002). For instance, the base of regime legitimacy in China is shifting from MarxLeninism to 
economic growth (Chen 2002; Zhao 2000). 
Social pressures are associated with the existence of heterogeneous groups with diverse beliefs 
and practices or changes in laws or social expectations (Oliver 1992; Scott 2001). For instance, 
following the economic liberalization in India in the 1990s, there has been a shift from a state-
dominated economic policy framework towards a decentralized one. Religious, social, economic, 
and political associations have become more powerful (Frankel 2006). 
A comparison of regulative institutions in China and India: Hypothesis development 
 
States differ in their capacities to intervene due to their unique institutional history and other 
situations they are facing (Fligstein 1996). China and India have different institutional history 
and characteristics, which have led to differences in environments related to entrepreneurship. A 
comparison of governance indicators in China and India for 2007 indicates that India performs 
better in areas such as voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. China, on the other hand, performs better in political stability and government 
effectiveness (Table 1). 
Chinese politics was arguably the most liberal in the 1980s (Huang 2008). The 1989 Tiananmen 
events was one of the biggest roadblocks facing Chinese entrepreneurs. It is argued that, in the 
1990s, the Chinese state reversed the gradualist political reforms (Huang 2008). 
India started relaxing industrial regulation in the early 1970s, trade liberalization began in the 
late 1970s, the pace of reform picked up significantly in the mid-1980s (Panagariya 2005). 
Indian entrepreneurship, however, got a big boost following the economic liberalization started 
in 1991. The pre-1991 reforms were “introduced quietly and without fanfare” (Panagariya 2005). 
Regulatory roles of the state in China and India 
 
Notwithstanding the existence of some essential elements of a democracy, the Indian political 
system has become inherently “unaccountable, corrupt, and unhinged from the normal bench 
marks voters use to assess their leaders” (Huang 2008). Court systems are overburdened and thus 
are characterized by procedural delays, and red tape (Bhattacharjya and Sapra 2008; Lancaster 
2003). The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor’s report, “Supporting Human Rights 
and Democracy: The US Record 2004–2005,” noted, “poor enforcement of laws, especially at 
the local level, and the severely overburdened court system weaken the delivery of justice.” 
According to the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center, there was a backlog of 23.5 
million cases in 2002 (Lancaster 2003). Likewise, the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 
2009 reported that it takes 1,420 days to enforce a contract in India compared with 150 days in 
Singapore. 
India’s court system is decentralized and is largely administered by its states. National labor laws 
in India are also administered at the state level (Deloitte 2006). The states have faced budget 
problems and have failed to comply with federal directives to hire more judges and upgrade legal 
infrastructures and court facilities (Lancaster 2003). One scholar noted, “Corrupted as they are 
by the party system, India’s institutions are incapable of enforcing accountability. India’s elites 
tolerate a level of poor governance and abuse of power that has led to the collapse of democracy 
elsewhere.”2 Beyond all that, in India, there are groups that campaign in support of traditional 
values. Notwithstanding their supports to modernization, the Indian government and court 
system are forced to settle for compromise, which means a slower progress than they would like 
to see (Baird 1998). 
China’s poor performance in terms of transparency, official accountability, and the rule of law is 
widely recognized in the literature (Economy and Segal 2008; Liu 2006). There has been an 
absence of effective procedural and remedial mechanisms. Corruption in the courts has been an 
issue of big concern in the country (Liu 2006). It is important to note that in the CCP’s Political-
Legal Committee, local party committees and local governments control personnel and funding 
in the courts (Liu 2006). Yet, having said this, it is apparent, too, that China’s shift toward the 
rule of law gained momentum in the 1990s (Fox 2008). 
Regarding China’s superiority over India, two further observations are worth making. As 
indicated earlier, in China, the base of regime legitimacy is shifting from MarxLeninism to 
economic growth (Chen 2002; Zhao 2000). Chinese leaders have set economic growth as the top 
priority (Zhao 2000). Moreover, many entrepreneurs in China arguably equate rule of law with 
democracy (Chen 2002). Second, as noted earlier, creation of institutions to promote 
entrepreneurship is a resource-intensive task and many emerging economies lack resources to 
create such institutions (Leblebici et al. 1991; Kshetri and Dholakia 2009). In this regard, China 
has more resources than India to create new institutions to support entrepreneurship and perform 
the regulative functions required for entrepreneurship development. Based on above discussion, 
the following hypothesis is presented: 
H1: The state’s regulatory role is more favorable to private businesses in China than in India. 
Participatory roles of the state in China and India 
 
Prior research suggests that the performance of firms depends upon their capability to control 
various aspects of the environment (Hirsch 1975). Since India is arguably the most populous 
democracy in the world, it is tempting to think that firms in the country are likely to have a 
higher degree of influence on the regulative contexts than firms in China. This is because 
democracy is inherently participative and collaborative. The existence of formal democratic 
structures, even if they are not implemented in practice, represents at least symbolic actions 
related to firms’ participation in national policy making (Kshetri 2008; Kshetri 2009a). Theorists 
argue that symbolic actions (e.g., existence of formal structures allowing private firms’ 
participation in national policymaking) lead to more substantive changes (private firms’ actual 
involvement in national policymaking) subsequently (Campbell 2004; Forbes and Jermier 2001; 
Guthrie 1999; Oakes et al. 1998). 
It is important to note that the economic liberalization undertaken since 1991 in India has been a 
major driving force behind the growth and increased importance of the private sector. A 
commonplace observation is that, since the 1990s, there has been a shift from a state-dominated 
economic policy framework towards a decentralized one (Kshetri and Dholakia 2009). Such 
shifts can be attributed to social pressures described earlier, which are associated with the 
existence of heterogeneous groups or changes in laws or social expectations (Oliver 1992; Scott 
2001). For instance, religious, social, economic, and political associations with diverse beliefs 
and practices have offered a viable set of examples encouraging the development of many new 
trade and professional associations and other organizations (Frankel 2006). A strong mutual 
interdependence between the state and the private economic actors, particularly organized 
business groups, has developed very quickly (Kshetri and Dholakia 2009). 
A comparison of India’s National Association of Software and Services Companies 
(NASSCOM) and China Software Industry Association (CSIA) indicates that India may perform 
better than China in terms of the participatory roles. In China, special interest groups and non-
government entities are organized loosely and there is little room for these groups to influence 
national policymaking (Li et al. 2004; Su and Yang 2000). Chinese government’s control 
arguably is a major obstacle to the autonomy and growth of associations in the country (Dickson 
2003; Frankel 2006). Compared to NASSCOM, CSIA has thus played a relatively minor role in 
transforming structure and practices of Chinese companies (Shen 2005). In line with these 
arguments, the following proposition is presented: 
H2: The state’s participatory role is more favorable to private businesses in India than in China. 
Supportive roles of the state in China and India 
 
As discussed earlier, the base of regime legitimacy in China is shifting from MarxLeninism to 
economic growth (Chen 2002; Zhao 2000). Chinese leaders have set economic growth as the top 
priority (Zhao 2000). The CCP arguably has “a tacit social contract” with its citizens to maintain 
a high level of economic growth so that its authority will not be challenged (Okimoto 2009, p. 
40). In sum, the CCP’s survival largely depends upon its economic performance (Chen 2002). 
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese government outperforms in infrastructure projects (Economy and 
Segal 2008). Some even argue that the post-Deng regime is only “rhetorically tied to Marxist 
ideology” (Chen 2002). The CCP expects that a richer economy might help burnish China’s 
image worldwide and increase respect for it. For that reason, Chinese government encourages 
entrepreneurship. China’s successful blend of nationalism and Marxism (Shlapentokh 2002) has 
provided impetus to entrepreneurship and investment. Most CCP leaders have realized that 
entrepreneurs’ contribution to the ambitious economic agenda outweigh the costs related to the 
challenges to the CCP’s legitimacy. For this reason, they are wholeheartedly promoting and 
facilitating entrepreneurial thinking and practices. Among other things, the Chinese government 
has taken measures to improve businesses’ access to credit (Economist 2009a). In sum, the 
private sector in China has more favorable environment to grow than in India (Chen 2002). The 
above leads to the following: 
H3: The state’s supportive role is more favorable to private businesses in China than in India. 
Data, analysis, and findings 
 
Our data are from The World Bank Group’s World Business Environment Survey (WBES 2000). 
WBES was administered to enterprises in 80 countries in late 1999 and early 2000. The data 
capture businesses’ perception of the effects of two decades of reforms on regulative institutions 
in both China and India. The survey utilized a standard core enterprise questionnaire 
methodology. Questions in the survey focused on the quality of the investment climate as shaped 
by domestic economic policy; governance; regulatory, infrastructure, and financial impediments; 
and assessments of the quality of public services (IFC 2007). We compared formal institutions 
related to the state’s regulatory, participatory, and supportive roles in the two economies. 
Statistical analysis 
 
To compare regulative institutions affecting entrepreneurship in India and China, we performed t 
tests. More specifically, we used a Satterthwaite method of t test, which is an alternative to the 
pooled-variance t test. A Satterthwaite method is used when the assumption that the two 
populations have equal variances seems unreasonable. It provides a t statistic that asymptotically 
(that is, as the sample sizes become large) approaches a t distribution, allowing for an 
approximate t test to be calculated when the population variances are not equal. The 
interpretations for most of the results, however, did not change with pooled-variance t tests. 
Note that the t test is parametric, which means that the scales used to measure businesses’ 
perceptions of various components of regulative institutions are assumed to be normally 
distributed. The advantages of parametric models include their rigorous mathematical 
foundations, and availability of straightforward estimation and computation methods. Such 
models are also parsimonious as a small number of parameters can completely describe the 
distribution of the businesses’ perceptions of various components of regulative institutions. A 
final advantage of parametric techniques is the easy interpretation of the results. 
One drawback of parametric models concerns their strong assumptions regarding functional 
forms. Parametric models thus may not be able to capture some particularities of the variables. 
Moreover, in some cases, the parameters of such models are not easy to understand. 
Regulatory role 
 
We begin by considering governments’ regulatory roles in the two economies. Table 2 displays 
the results for the businesses’ perception of their states’ regulatory roles in terms of the court 
systems’ efficiency in dealing with business disputes. We took question no. 11 in the WBES for 
this purpose.3 It read, “In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s court 
system to be.” “Fair and Impartial,” “Honest/Uncorrupt,” “Quick,” “Affordable,” “Consistent,” 
and “Decisions Enforced.” In the “Always” (1) to “Never” (6) scale, the difference of means 
between India and China was statistically significantly (t = −1.72, p < 0.10).4 This indicates that 
businesses in China perceived their court system more favorably compared to those in India. 




Question no. 95 asked to rate “overall perception of the relation between government and/or 
bureaucracy and private firms.” The item: “All in all, for doing business I perceive the state as” 
was measured in very helpful (1)–very unhelpful (5) scale for the central/national government as 
well as for the local/regional government. Moreover, the respondents were asked to rate their 
perceptions of governments at both levels for “now” and “3 years ago.” Table 3 presents 
businesses’ perception of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy (central/national 
level) and private firms “Now,” that is, in 1999/2000. The difference between means of the two 
countries (India–China) was statistically insignificant (t = −0.53, p > 0.59). 
Table 3 is omitted from this formatted document. 
In the same manner, businesses’ perceptions of the relation between government and/or 
bureaucracy (local/regional level) and private firms are presented in Table 3 for “Now,” that is, 
in 1999/2000. The difference between means of the two countries was statistically significant 
(t = −1.89, p < 0.1), which indicated that China outperformed India in terms of bureaucratic 
supports to entrepreneurship at the local/regional level. 
Similarly, Table 4 presents businesses’ perception of the relation between government and/or 
bureaucracy (central/national level) and private firms “3 years ago,” that is, in 1996/1997. The 
difference between the two countries was −0.373, which was statistically insignificant (t = 0.90, 
p < 0.37). In the same manner, businesses’ perceptions of the relation between government 
and/or bureaucracy (local/regional level) are presented in Table 4 for 1996/1997. The difference 
of means between the two economies was statistically significant (t = −2.48, p < 0.05). 
Table 4 is omitted from this formatted document. 
Table 5 presents shifts in private firms’ perception of the relation between government and/or 
bureaucracy with the central/national level as well as at the local/regional level. Indian private 
firms reported higher shifts than Chinese private firms at both levels. The difference of the mean 
between India and China at the central/national level was statistically significant (t = −2.21, 
p < 0.05). A similar point can be made about the shifts at the local/regional level (t = −1.67, 
p < 0.10). 
Table 5 is omitted from this formatted document. 
Supportive role 
 
Question no. 7 stated6, “Please judge on a four-point scale how problematic are these different 
regulatory areas for the operation and growth of your business.” Various areas included in the 
questionnaire are presented in Table 6. In the No Obstacle (1)–Major Obstacle (4) scale, the 
difference of the means between the two countries was statistically significant (t = 5.85, 
p < 0.0001). 
Table 6 is omitted from this formatted document. 
Discussion and implications 
 
The regulatory institutions to support entrepreneurship do not develop uniformly across all 
economies. Because of differences in contexts and backgrounds, the two Asian giants considered 
in this paper have exhibited wide differences in such institutions. While there are some studies 
examining the China–India differences (e.g., Huang 2008), none does so in a way that quite 
serves the empirical objectives of this study. To the authors’ knowledge, these data and analyses 
provide the first comprehensive empirical documentation of the differences. The present study 
thus fills a large gap in the institutional and entrepreneurship literatures by providing clear and 
convincing evidence related to different elements of regulative institutions in the two Asian 
giants. This paper disentangled the components of regulative institutions in the two countries and 
compared them. 
Table 7 presents our findings regarding different components of regulative institutions in China 
and India. Most of the hypothesized effects are statistically significant and in the expected 
direction. The results indicated that China outperformed India in most of the indicators related to 
regulative institutions impacting entrepreneurship. 
Table 7 
Findings regarding different components of regulative institutions in China and India 
Functions Explanation Findings 
Regulative 
Court systems’ efficiency 
in dealing with business 
disputes 
Chinese government provided more favorable 
environment than Indian government 
Participative 
Businesses’ perception of 




Relationship between central/national level 
bureaucracy and private firms: no difference 
between the two countries 
Relationship between local/regional level 
bureaucracy and private firms: India 
outperformed China 
1996/1997 
Relationship between central/national level 
bureaucracy and private firms: no difference 
between the two countries 
Functions Explanation Findings 
Relationship between local/regional level 
bureaucracy and private firms: China 
outperformed India 
Shift during 1996/1997–1999/2000 
 Indian businesses reported a bigger shifts in 
private firms’ relationships with 
central/national level bureaucracy as well as 
local/regional level bureaucracy 
Supportive 
Regulatory areas for the 
operation and growth of 
private businesses 
Chinese government provided more favorable 
environment than the Indian government 
 
Implications for management and public policy 
 
Prior researchers have found that economic freedom and political freedom “typically go hand in 
hand” and are highly correlated (La Porta et al. 2004). This means that economies that lack 
political freedom are also likely to have a low level of economic liberalization, which is essential 
for promoting private entrepreneurship. Our findings might counter such arguments by 
suggesting that authoritarian regimes might be able to create an environment conducive for 
private entrepreneurship without political reforms. On the other hand, democracy is not 
necessarily related to economic freedom. For instance, our analysis indicates that indicators 
related to regulative institutions affecting entrepreneurship and the World Bank’s governance 
indicators are not in concord. While India outperforms China in most areas of the World Bank’s 
governance indicators (World Bank 2008b, Table 1), the reverse is the case of regulative 
institutions affecting entrepreneurship. 
China’s economic performance has been remarkable despite the fact that its economic and 
political institutions have not followed Western prescriptions and mainstream economic theory 
(Nolan 1994). The findings of this article have helped explore several issues related to the China 
puzzle. Liberal democratic as well as authoritarian states can take a page from the lesson book of 
China. 
Our analysis also pinpoints problematic areas related to regulative institutions in China and India 
that need to be addressed. Varshney (2007) noted, “Democracy and market reform are uneasily 
aligned in India.” China, despite its authoritarian governance system, is outgrowing India. This 
article provided detailed insights into mechanisms associated with China’s superior economic 
performance. In this regard, the findings of this article provide some guidance in producing a 
better alignment. We have pinpointed some areas where India can improve. More to the point, in 
order to prepare its economy to compete with China, India needs to implement wide-ranging 
institutional reforms to improve variables such as the overall level of bureaucratic quality and 
corruptions in the court system. 
While China has outperformed India in many aspects of regulative institutions, there are still 
plenty of rooms for improvement. Some areas need more attention and focus than others. As our 
analysis indicates, one of the most problematic areas is China’s court system. Especially, the 
speed with which the courts hear and decide a case has been slower than businesses would like to 
see. That said, a comparison with Central and Eastern European economies (Kshetri 2010) 
indicates that Chinese businesses’ perceptions of the country’s court system are more favorable 
than they are for the businesses in many CEE economies of their respective court systems. 
Looking at businesses’ perceptions of the Chinese court systems, we also find that the lack of 
honesty and pervasiveness of corruption are seen as problematic areas that need particular 
attention. 
A comparison of China and India indicates that the court systems are perceived as more fair and 
impartial in India than in China. Moreover, Indian court systems are perceived as being more 
honest and uncorrupt than China’s. Measures to develop fair, impartial, honest, and uncorrupt 
court systems are of paramount importance for China, which would allow it to further 
outperform India. 
The analysis of this paper has strong economic and political implications for developed countries 
as well. Koo (1998) noted that the “progress in China has been scarcely noted in the Western 
media and overshadowed by the focus on the human rights abuses as perceived by the West.” 
This observation remains generally true today as well. The Western media have neglected to pay 
enough attention to transformations undergoing the Chinese entrepreneurship landscape. Despite 
a lack of political freedom, China’s entrepreneurial performance has been stronger than meets 
the eye. The development of entrepreneurship-friendly institutions indicates evidence of 
catching-up processes in the Chinese economy. 
Limitations and future research 
 
The data used in the paper were collected in 1999–2000. This is both its limitation and 
contribution. As noted earlier, the data capture businesses’ perception of the effects of more than 
two decades of reforms on regulative institutions in China and India. There obviously is a need 
for studies comparing institutional in the two countries that are based on more recent data. 
Further theoretical and empirical research is also needed to gain a better understanding of 
regulative institutions’ impacts on entrepreneurship development in emerging economies. Future 
research based on the present framework can be extended to other emerging economies. 
Prior researchers have suggested that institutional changes “have effects that are particularistic” 
(Dacin et al. 2002, p. 45). To put things in context, regulative institutions in China and India may 
differ across different industries. For instance, observers have noted that India outperforms China 
in some areas such as banking (Huang 2008). In future conceptual and empirical work, scholars 
need to compare and contrast regulative institutions from the standpoints of specific economic 
sectors (e.g., banking, retailing, high technology, etc.). 
Finally, as to the government’s role in shaping entrepreneurship landscape in emerging 
economies, it is important to note that the government can do little to bring changes in informal 
institutions. In China, for instance, although formal institutions such as rules and laws are 
changing rapidly, some institutional actors such as decision makers in state-owned banks and 
other agencies, local cadres, tax officers, and government officials (Economist 2002; Yang 2002) 
are trapped in the socialist mindset. For instance, studies have reported Chinese societies’ 
negative perception of those trying to build their own company (Harwit 2002) and some people 
in the country consider entrepreneurs as “selfish, avaricious peddlers,” or “getihu” (Hsu 2006). 
In this regard, a comparison of informal institutions influencing entrepreneurship in the two 
countries might be a worthwhile target of study. 
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Footnotes 
1 Chi Lo, Author of Phantom of the China Economic Threat, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
  
2 Appu Soman, Letter to Editors, Foreign Policy, September/October 2008, Issue 168, p14. 
  
3 As an alternative measure of the regulatory role, businesses’ perceptions of their competitors’ 
compliance with laws can also be used, which is measured by question no. 35 in the WBES. The 
question read, “Please judge on a four point scale how problematic are the following practices of 
your competitors for your firm?” This measure, however, could not be used because of missing 
data for Indian businesses. 
  
4 We used Satterthwaite method of t test, which is an alternative to the pooled-variance t test. 
Satterthwaite method is used when the assumption that the two populations have equal variances 
seems unreasonable. It provides a t statistic that asymptotically (that is, as the sample sizes 
become large) approaches a t distribution, allowing for an approximate t test to be calculated 
when the population variances are not equal (http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/output/ttest.htm). 
Note, however, that interpretations for most of the results did not change with pooled-variance t 
test. 
  
5 As an alternative measure of participatory roles, question no. 10 in the WBES can be used, 
which read, “When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a 
substantial impact on your business, how much influence does your firm typically have at the 
national level of government on the content of that law, rule, regulation or decree?” This 
question consisted of four items related to executive, legislative, ministry, and regulatory agency. 
This question, however, could not be used because of missing data for Indian businesses. 
  
6 As an alternative measure of supportive role, question no. 8 in WBES can be used, which read, 
“How often does the government intervene in the following types of decisions by your firm?” 
This question consisted of seven items. This measure, however, could not be used because of 
missing data for Chinese businesses. 
